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LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION AND AWARD-Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Which Rely
on the Practices of the Parties
Modem collective bargaining agreements typically provide for
private arbitration as the means of resolving disputes between employees and management over the interpretation and application of
the agreement. In the event the arbitrator's decision is challenged in
court by the adversely-affected party, the question of how much
judicial deference should be given to the private ruling becomes of
some importance. The Supreme Court has set out guidelines which
purport to define the proper role of courts in such disputes-that
role being for the most part one of judicial deference to arbitrator's
decisions. Nevertheless, the appropriate scope of judicial review
remains unclear. 1 This lack of clarity is especially manifest in the
uncertainty that lower courts have displayed in attempting to apply
the guidelines to cases in which the arbitration award is based upon
the past practices of the parties rather than upon the express terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. 2 Some courts, in dealing
with such cases, have overstepped the guidelines, perhaps out of a
fear that they provide insufficient means for judicial control over
the exercise of discretion by arbitrators. 3 This note will suggest a
framework for analysis of the judicial role in "past practices" cases
and will propose a modification of the guidelines which might
reconcile the lower courts' reluctance to allow arbitrators unbridled
discretion with the reluctance of the Supreme Court to sanction
judicial interference in the arbitrators' sphere of competence and
authority.
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court held, in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 4 that section 30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act6 gives the federal courts jurisdiction to entertain suits to enforce arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
I. See Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 l\fICH. L. R.Ev. 751 (1965).
2. Because the multifarious nature of the relationship governed by a collective
bargaining agreement makes impossible the reduction of every aspect of the contractual relationship to express terms, reliance on past practices has been of particular
importance in this area. See Comment, The Doctrine of Past Practice in Labor
Arbitration, 38 U. CoLO. L. R.Ev. 229 (1966). See also Aaron, The Uses of the Past in
Arbitration, 1955 NAT'L ACADEMY OF .ARBITRATORS PROCEEDINGS I; McLaughlin, Custom
and Past Practice in Labor Arbitration, 18 ARB. J. 205 (1963); Mittenthal, Past
Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 1017 (1961); see note 27 infra and cases cited therein.
3. See the discussion of Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 362 F.2d 677
(2d Cir. 1966), and H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir.
1964), in text accompanying notes 20-41 and 42·50 infra.
4. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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agreements, 6 and encouraged the lower courts to develop a body of
federal common law, based on the "policy of our national labor
laws," to govern their role in such suits.7 Three years later, however,
in response to a concern that the courts were thereby infringing
upon the arbitrators' authority as the interpreters of collective
bargaining agreements, 8 the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers trilogy, 9 three landmark decisions which have been viewed as
having "dispelled the specter of judicial intrusion into the arbitration process created by the Court's earlier decision in ... Lincoln
Mills." 10 In brief, the trilogy requires the courts to abstain from
passing on the merits of the bargaining agreement dispute; specifically, the arbitrator's construction of the agreement is not reviewable for errors of either fact or law.11
After the trilogy, the courts were still left with a residuum of
power to review. Courts exercising this power have seldom precisely
articulated the grounds upon which their review is justified. Never6. 353 U.S. at 456.
7. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process-The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1147 (1957); Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957);
Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining,
43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH.
L. R:Ev. 635 (1959).
8. See, e.g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 247 (1958); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. R:Ev.
1482, 1483 (1959); see Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960).
Many of the lower courts assumed that in determining the arbitrability of a dis·
pute they were to construe the terms of the contract itself in order to determine
whether it could reasonably support the contentions of the party seeking to compel
arbitration. This approach was formulated in the case of International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, affd 297
N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947), and came to be known as the Cutler-Hammer view.
See Comment, The Emergent Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: A Survey
of the Law Under Section 301, 28 U. CHI. L. R:Ev. 707, 731-32 (1961); 10 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 278 (1959). An example of this judicial assumption can be found in Portland
Web Pressman's Union v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 286 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960).
9. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
The two landmark commentaries on the trilogy are Hays, The Supreme Court and
Labor Law October Term 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. R:Ev. 901, 919-35 (1960), and Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Cm. L. R:Ev. 464
(1961). See generally Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the
Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.AL. REv. 360 (1962); Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration:
The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAw. 138 (1960); Snyder, What Has
the Supreme Court Done to Arbitration?, 12 LAB. L.J. 93 (1961); Symposium, Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 466, 494-520, 532-44 (1963).
10. Aaron, supra note 9.
11. 363 U.S. 593, at 596, 598-99 (1960); 363 U.S. 574, at 585 (1960); 363 U.S. 564,
at 567-68 (1960). Of course, the principle that courts may not review the award of
an arbitrator for error of either fact or law is one to which the courts have been
paying lip service for many years. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854);
Georgia & F. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 217 Fed. 755 (5th Cir. 1914).
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theless, for the sake of analysis, the grounds permitted by the trilogy
for reviewing an arbitration proceeding may be grouped into three
categories.12 The first two categories derive from the Court's statement that "the judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make
the award he made." 13 From this language, it is evident that the
courts have the authority to determine whether the grievance is
arbitrable, that is, within the arbitrator's subject-matter jurisdiction
under the contract [category (1)]14 and whether, even if the con12. Commentators differ as to the appropriate breakdown of the possible grounds
for challenging court enforcement of an arbitration award. Leaving aside matters
not relevant here, Meltzer lists only two subdivisions (Meltzer, supra note 9, at 464
n.5), whereas Smith & Jones list eight (Smith & Jones, supra note 1, at 780-81 "claims"
1-7 & 12). Neither of these analyses, however, purports to include only those grounds
that would be upheld under the trilogy. See Cornfield, Developing Standards for
Determining Arbitrability of Labor Disputes by Federal Courts, 14 LAB. L.J. 564
(1963); Schmertz, When and Where Issue of Arbitrability Can Be Raised, P-H LAB•
.ARB. SERv., Report Bull. No. 3, July 19, 1962.
13. 363 U.S. 574, at 582 (1960).
14. Additional support for this category is found in the following language from
the trilogy: "Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions on which the parties disagree ••• come within the scope of the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective agreement." 363 U.S. 574, at 581 (1960).
Category (1) has been correctly limited to those cases in which the agreement
makes it clear that the type of grievance at issue was not intended to be appealable
to the arbitrator. Thus it has been stated that:
[U]nder the broad and comprehensive standard labor arbitration clause every
grievance is arbitrable, unless the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning grievances and arbitration contain some clear and unambiguous
clause of exclusion, or there is some other term of the agreement that indicates
beyond peradventure of doubt that a grievance concerning a particular matter
is not intended to be covered by the grievance and arbitration procedure • . • .
Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644,
645-46 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Taft Broadcasting Co. v. Radio Broadcast Technicians,
298 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1962); Radio Corp. of America v. Association of Professional
Eng'r. Personnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961); Lodge 912, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
General Elec. Co., 236 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1964). An example of an appropriate
utilization of this category is to be found in Communications Workers v. Telephone
Co., 327 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964), in which the court refused to order arbitration of a
grievance concerning a temporary promotion where the contract clause covering
promotions stipulated that grievances arising out of issues covered by that clause
would not be subject to arbitration.
Even as to this category, however, the path to be followed by the lower courts has
not been clearly delineated. For example, assuming that parties can exclude a particular subject from arbitration by a collateral agreement to that effect as well as
by a provision in the principal contract, the question has arisen as to whether evidence concerning the alleged exclusion-e.g., negotiations leading to the purported
agreement-should be admissible in determining the issue of abritrability. Some
courts have held that such evidence is admissible, e.g., Local 787, Int'! Union of Elec.
Workers v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963); others have excluded
similar evidence, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. "\\Testinghouse Elec.
Corp., 228 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1274 (1965); and still others
appear to have decided the issue without actually having confronted it, e.g., Flintkote Co, v. Textile Workers, 243 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J. 1965). See generally Smith,
The Question of "Arbitrability"-Roles of Arbitrator, the Court, and the Parties, 16
Sw. L.J. I (1962),
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troversy is arbitrable, the arbitrator exceeded specific contractual
limits on his authority in making his decision [category (2)].10 The
third category [category (3)] is derived from a passage which has been
relied upon by nearly every lower court that has declined to enforce
an award, perhaps because it is the only language in the trilogy with
a ring to it that runs counter to the general emphasis upon the arbitrator's autonomy:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the
15. One student commentator has suggested that "arbitrability" in the category
(I) sense of jurisdiction-not the problem of authority to render a given award-was
the only question at issue in the trilogy. Note, Admissibility of Parol Evidence in
Judidal Determinations of Arbitrability, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1274, 1274 n.5 (1965). This
suggestion, however, is clearly incorrect, as one of the trilogy cases, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), itself involved the
challenge of an award solely on the ground that as to a portion of the remedy the
arbitrator had exceeded his contractual authority.
The rationale of the decisions under category (I) (see note 14 supra) would indicate that a refusal to enforce an award under this category should be based only
upon a clear and unambiguous expression in the contract of an intention to prohibit
the arbitrator from exercising the specific power in question. An example of an appropriate application of this category is provided by Truck Drivers v. Ulry-Talbert
Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). The contract in that case stated that, as to grievances arising out of the provision concerning discharges, "the arbitration board shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the management and shall only reverse the
action •.• of the management if it finds that the Company's complaint against the
employee is not supported by the facts • . . ." The arbitrator found that the discharged employee had, in fact, falsified his time card in violation of the rules, but,
feeling that discharge was too severe a penalty, he nevertheless ordered reinstatement.
The court vacated the award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded the
express limitation on his powers as set forth in the contract. Consistent with that
decision is Local 2130, Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Bally Case & Cooler, Inc., 232
F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Under a contract allowing discharge for "just cause"
(and making no explicit mention of a discretionary authority in the arbitrator to
substitute suspension in instances where discharge was deemed unwarranted) the
arbitrator awarded reinstatement to three employees with varying degrees of back
pay based on his view of the degree of seriousness of their respective offenses. The
court upheld the award on the ground that the contract "did not specifically deny"
to the arbitrator either the power to consider whether there was just cause for
suspension rather than discharge or the authority to determine the amount of back
pay to be awarded in a particular instance. A contrary result was reached in Textile
Workers v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961), where an award of
reinstatement without back pay was vacated on the ground that the alleged rule
violation did not constitute "just cause" for discharge, as opposed to suspension.
Although there was no express limitation on the arbitrator's powers of the type
found in Ulry-Talbert, supra, the court read such a limitation into the management's
"inherent right" to discipline and the meaning of "just cause." See Note, The Scope
of Judidal Review in Arbitration Proceedings, 13 W. R.Es. L. REv. 596, 598-99 (1962),
where the Amercan Thread decision is declared to be "in conflict with fthe) recent
trilogy of Supreme Court cases which are the landmarks for the treatment of labor
arbitration by the federal courts." A similar view of American Thread is expressed
by Christensen, Book Review, 19 STAN. L. REv. 671, 686 (1967).
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arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.16
Under this last category of judicial authority, a court may review
and set aside an award when the arbitrator, by basing his award on
some source wholly extraneous to the agreement between the parties,
has violated his obligation to interpret and apply the contract.17
These three specific exceptions to the general rule of judicial noninterference, then, must constitute the bases for a court's proper
refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award, including, of course, a refusal to enforce an award based on the past practices of the parties.
Category (1) is only concerned with the arbitrator's subjectmatter jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, 18 not the factors he may
or may not rely upon in reaching his decision; therefore, it may not
properly be used by courts as a basis for deciding that an arbitrator's
award should be set aside because it was based on past practices.19
16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
17. It is a thesis of the present Note that the Supreme Court intended this category
of jurisdiction to be far nauower than the scope attributed to it by the lower courts.
One case comes close enough to the meaning of this category to wauant mention
here. In Local 791, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. Magnavox Co., 286 F.2d 465 (6th
Cir. 1961), the union claimed that a company-initiated assembly line speed-up constituted a violation of the collective bargaining contract. After dismissing the grievance on the ground that the union had failed to carry its burden of showing that
the speed-up constituted an "unfair" change under the contract, the arbitrator went
on to order the parties to negotiate concerning the implementation of appropriate
engineering studies regarding assembly line speed. Where the grievance itself has been
dismissed, it is a close question whether such an order is an instance of an arbitrator
"dispensing his own brand of industrial justice" or a legitimate incident of his function in settling the contract dispute. It is therefore of interest to note that in vacating this award the court relied on language in the contract which expressly limited
the arbitrator's powers, i.e., the court treated it as a category (2), rather than category
(3), case.
18. See discussion in Christensen, supra note 15, at 678-93.
19. Clearly, category (1) is inappropriate in past practices cases, and no court has
chosen to reply on such a basis for its jurisdiction. The courts have also held that
arbitrability is not to be denied on the ground that there is no provision in the
contract on which an award for the grievant could be based. See Livingston v. John
Wiley &: Sons, 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); International
Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964); Minute
Maid Co. v. Citrus Workers, 331 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Lodge 12,
Int'! Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1961);
United Saw Workers v. H. K. Porter Co., 190 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Arbitrability is not to be denied on the ground that limitations on the arbitrator's
authority prohibit him from reaching a result in favor of the grievant, e.g., Carey v.
General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964);
Livingston v. John 'Wiley &: Sons, supra; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes
Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1961). Compare Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Union,
353 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1965), with Trailways of New England, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. &: Motor Coach Employees, 353 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1965). Cf.
Greater Kansas City Laborers v. Builders Ass'n, 217 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1963). See
also cases cited in Smith&: Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance
Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REv. 831, 859 n.79 (1966).
In International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., supra, the Court
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Category (2) gives courts the power to deny enforcement of an
award as improperly based upon past practices if, but only if, the
contract contains a provision which prohibits the arbitrator from
looking beyond the express terms of the contract. 20 However, in
a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
the court apparently relied upon category (2) grounds in refusing
to enforce an arbitrator's award based on past practices even though
there was no finding of a contractual requirement that the arbitrator adhere to the written provisions of the contract. In Torrington
Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 21 the company, during the term of the
old contract, announced, over the objection of the union, its
intention to discontinue a long-standing practice of giving its employees paid time-off to vote on election days. The company reiterated its position during the negotiations for a new contract, but
failed to deal with this issue when it submitted a formal proposal to
extend the old contract with specified amendments. The new contract which emerged from the negotiations contained no paid voting
time provision. When the company later refused to grant paid
voting time, the union filed a grievance which ultimately went to
arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, holding as
follows: (a) this long-standing benefit, though unilaterally extended,
had become an implied contractual obligation which the company
could discontinue only by negotiation with the union; (b) the company was the first to withdraw the issue from the negotiations for
the new contract, since its offer to continue the old contract with
specified amendments did not include termination of the benefit;
and (c) the final bargain did not include an agreement, tacit or express, to discontinue the implied benefit, and thus it remained part
of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.22
In opposing enforcement of this award in court, the company
argued that a statement in the contract providing that the arbitrator
"shall have no power to add to . . . the provisions of this agreement"23 was an express limitation on the arbitrator's powers which
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which also decided the Torrington case, affirmed
an order compelling arbitration despite the company's argument that because the
union had tried and failed during the contract negotiations to include a provision
that would have covered the dispute at issue, the grievance was not one concering
the "interpretation or application of a provision of the contract" within the meaning
of the arbitration clause. It is of interest that Chief Judge Lombard, the author
of the opinion in Torrington, dissented on that occasion. See discussion in Smith &:
Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges,
Arbitration, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REv. 831, 850-54, 858-60 (1966); Smith &: Jones,
The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63
MICH. L. REv. 751, 784 (1965).
20. See note 15 supra.
21. 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
22. In re the Torrington Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 353, 355-56 (1965).
23. The arbitration provision is set forth in 362 F.2d at 678 n.2, and provides in
part that: "The arbitrator shall be bound by .•• the terms of this agreement and
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he violated in making his award. 24 Whether this contention raises a
proper category (2) issue depends initially upon whether this "boiler
plate" contractual language25 should be viewed as prohibiting the
arbitrator from adding to the written provisions of the contract
obligations implied from the past practices of the parties, or whether
it simply forbids him from adding obligations not already expressed
in the contract or implied from the practices of the parties.26 Arbi-,
trators have frequently ruled that this sort of contract language does
not prohibit the implication of obligations from past practices,27
and the Torrington court did not hold otherwise.28 Instead, the
court seems to have held that the past practices of the parties did not
in fact support the arbitrator's finding that the obligation to grant
paid voting time should be implied; thus, it ruled that the arbitrahe shall have no power to add to, delete from, or modify, in any way any of the
provisions of this agreement . • • .''
24. Brief for Appellee, pp. 6, 8, &: 11.
25. See cases discussed in note 27 infra.
26. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAR.v. L. REv.
999, 1011 (1955). The Torrington decision has been criticized on the ground that the
bargaining history surrounding the wording of the arbitration clause in the new
contract, as opposed to that in the former contract, indicates that the parties did
not intend to limit the source of contractual obligations to the written provisions
of the agreement. Christensen, supra note 15, at 690-93.
In Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d
112 (5th Cir. 1961), the company argued that the grievance was not arbitrable because
it was not covered by any provision of the written contract, and the limitation
denying the arbitrator authority to "supplement the terms of [the] agreement" precluded him from finding for the grievant. On the question of the arbitrator's authority to expand the express terms of the agreement in light of such a limitation,
the court said:
So far as the term "supplement" is concerned it can not be read literally to rule
out the right of arbitrators-just as would a court-to find substantive rights,
obligations and duties which are implied though not expressed. The alternative
to this would make the agreement to arbitrate superfluous, for the sole inquiry
would then be: is it expressed in the contract?
292 F.2d at 118. See also Wilson H. Lee Co. v. New Haven Printing Pressmen, 248
F. Supp. 289 (D. Conn. 1965).
27. In International Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 276 (1953), the contract included
the standard limitation prohibiting the arbitrator from "adding to" the agreement,
and did not contain any provision for the retention of unmentioned past benefits. In
concluding that the company could not unilaterally discontinue the long standing
practice of granting paid wash-up time, Arbitrator Wirtz noted "There is ••• a fast
growing body of private arbitration precedent which denies any broad managerial
right, in the absence of express reservation, to change important practices during the
contract term." Id. at 279-80. (The arbitrator also relied on his conclusion that unilateral termination of the benefit would be an unfair labor practice under the decisions of the NLRB.) Likewise, in Pennsylvania Forge Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 732 (1960)
(Christmas bonus), there was neither an add-to provision nor mention of a retentionof-benefits provision in the arbitrator's opinion. See Anaconda Aluminum Co., 45 Lab.
Arb. 277 (1965); Stepan Chem. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 34 (1965); Lutheran Medical Center,
44 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964); Tonawanda Publishing Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 892 (1964); Keystone
Lighting Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 145 (1964).
28. The opinion states that the trilogy language on which category (3) is based
(quoted in text accompanying note 16 supra) makes an arbitrator's authority to expand the express terms of the contract .on the basis of the parties' prior practices
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tor "added to" the terms of the agreement. This ruling, of course,
could only be made after a review of the arbitrator's finding of fact,
contrary to the policy set forth in the trilogy. The court found the
facts and the law as follows: 29 (I) the company's original announcement did terminate effectually the paid voting time benefit,30 since
the narrow arbitration clause of the contract then in force 31 indicated that the power to discontinue unilaterally such a practice
had not been excepted from the usual prerogatives of management;32 (2) the court refused to accept the arbitrator's finding that
the company withdrew this demand from the bargaining table, 33 apparently accepting instead the lower court's finding that "throughout the negotiations, the plaintiff employer persistently reiterated
its position not to grant this benefit;"34 and (3) the court rejected
the arbitrator's position that the company had an affirmative burden
to secure an agreement to discontinue the benefit,35 and instead
suggested that once the question of the termination of a long standing benefit has been raised in negotiations, the benefit should be
subject to judicial review, but the precise nature and scope of this review is left unclear, 362 F.2d at 680. However, nowhere in the opinion does the court state that there
was no such authority under the contract at issue.
29. The following order is not necessarily that in which these points appear in
the opinion. Rather, the presentation here is an attempt to reconstruct the grounds
of the decision desultorily set forth in the court's opinion.
30. 362 F.2d at 681. This conclusion is, of course, a direct reversal of that reached
by the arbitrator on this point. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
31. The relevant section of the arbitration clause then in force is set forth in
362 F.2d at 681 n.7. It includes the following statement: "The Company's decisions
•.. will not be overruled by any arbitrator unless the arbitrator can find that the
Company misinterpreted or violated the express terms of the agreement."
32. But cf. Harmon v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods., 227 F. Supp. 9
(D. Ore. 1964), in which the court, interpreting a collective bargaining agreement that
contained no arbitration provision, found that the company could not unilaterally
abrogate the practice of paid traveling time to and from work-a practice not mentioned in the contract.
33. 362 F.2d at 681.
34. Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 60 L.R.R.M. 2262, 2264 (D. Conn.
1965).
35. The court actually assumed that the arbitrator had placed the burden "of
securing an express contract provision in the [new] contract on the company." 362
F.2d at 682. Apparently, this interpretation of the basis for the award is drawn from
the arbitrator's statements that the company was obligated to continue the implied
contractual benefit "until such time as it negotiated a change in the matter" (45 Lab.
Arb. at 355) and that "the final bargain between the parties did not include an agreement to discontinue the practice." Id. at 356. The court's interpretation of this language, however, is unmistakenly erroneous, for it is clear that, in the arbitrator's
opinion, an agreement during the negotiations to discontinue the benefit would have
been sufficient. He regarded the issue as being "whether that obligation [to grant paid
voting time] was bargained off the table in the negotiations which resulted in the
current labor agreement" (id. at 355), and subsequently reached a negative conclusion
on this question. The court goes on to imply that, contrary to the arbitrator's view,
the burden is on the union to secure an express provision retaining the paid voting
benefit because "labor contracts generally state affirmatively what conditions the parties agree to, more specifically, what restraints the parties will place on management's
freedom of action." 362 F.2d at 681. But see Comment, Arbitration and Award-Interpretation of Arbitration Claiist:s in (;Qllt:ctive Bargaining Agreements, 36 N.Y.UL.
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deemed conclusively terminated if the new contract does not expressly provide for its continuation.36 Thus, the court appears to
have denied enforcement of the arbitration award on the ground
that it was based on an obligation which the arbitrator implied by
applying an erroneous rule of law37 to erroneous conclusions of
fact. 38
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Torrington court engaged
in a review of the merits of the arbitrator's award. It is not easy to
follow the court's rationale in this apparent circumvention of the
trilogy's hands-off policy. In addition to purporting to enforce a
specific contractual limitation on the arbitrator's authority-an
apparent category (2) approach-it also blends into its reasoning the
language of category (3), quoting the "manifest infidelity" passage
of the trilogy, 39 and further noting that the arbitrator's award
"should not be accepted where the reviewing Court can clearly
perceive that he has derived that authority from sources outside the
collective bargaining agreement at issue." 40 Thus, the court's conclusion seems to be that when an arbitrator has erroneously found
that a particular obligation is part of an agreement, he has both
"added to," and failed to base his award upon, the agreement.41
REv. 233 (1961), where it is asserted that the trilogy rejected the theretofore prevailing
view that management retains all rights not expressly contracted away.

36. The court states:
While it may be appropriate to resolve a question never raised during negotiations on the basis of prior practice . • • it is quite another thing to assume that
the contract confers a specific benefit when that benefit was discussed during
negotiations but omitted from the contract.
362 F.2d at 681. This position has also been advanced by Mittenthal, Past Practice
and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 59 MICH. L. REv. 1017,
1040-41 (1961), to which one student commentator has replied:
Some authorities say that if unilateral objection to a past practice is made at
contract negotiations, the practice should no longer be a binding condition of
employment.••• This argument, however, has not been generally accepted by
arbitrators. It has many faults. It would allow one party to destroy almost all
past practices without negotiation or agreement of any kind. . . . The essential
feature of bargaining for a new contract is that gains to one side are substantially
balanced by new provisions favoring the other. The same should be true for bargaining over past practices.
Comment, The Doctrine of Past Practice in Labor Arbitration, 38 U. CoLO. L. REv.
229, 246 (1966).
37. I.e., the rules concerning abrogation of a benefit that has become an implied
contractual right as a result of long-,tanding practice.
38. I.e., the powers of management under the former contract and the question of
what was bargained off the table by whom during negotiations over the new contract.
39. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
40. 362 F.2d at 680.
41. The following statement of the Supreme Court in Enterprise is especially
pertinent to the court of appeals' disposition of Torrington:
Respondent's major argument seems to be that applying correct principles of law
to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement it can be determined
that the agreement did not so provide, and that therefore the arbitrator's decision
was not based upon the contract. The acceptance of this view would require
courts, even under the standard arbitration clause, to review the merits of every
construction of the contract.
363 U.S. at 598-99.
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This conclusion is no more justified by the language of category
(3) than it is by that of category (2). 42 The trilogy clearly indicates
that the agreement upon which an arbitrator's award must be based
may include much more than the integrated contract; 43 the language
of category (3) that the award draw its essence from the agreement
is properly utilized as a basis for review only when the award clearly
purports to be founded on something other than the arbitrator's
(not the court's) interpretation of the parties' agreement. 44
However, the position of the court in Torrington does find support in the 1964 case of H.K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers4ti
in which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also apparently
assumed that an award is not "drawn from" the agreement within
the meaning of category (3) if it is based upon an implied or modified term which the arbitrator has erroneously deduced from the
parties' practices. In Porter two classes of employees whose jobs were
being terminated by the closing of a plant and who did not come
within the express terms of the pension eligibility clause of the collective bargaining contract demanded pension benefits. The contract
limited benefits to parties who had both completed twenty-five years
of continuous service and had reached a designated age. However,
the arbitrator found that the management pension board which
administered the pension plan had on occasion deviated from the
express terms of the eligibility clauses.46 He therefore concluded
that the board had been guided by the "spirit" of the eligibility
clause rather than its exact wording, and that he, too, was free to
give it such a broad interpretation. He awarded full pensions to the
class of employees who had completed twenty-five years or more of
total service, whether or not they met the age requirement, and prorata pension benefits to those who had reached the required age but
had less than twenty-five years of service. The court upheld the
award to the first mentioned class, but refused to enforce the prorata award to the latter class. It reasoned that, while the arbitrator
had authority to deviate from the express terms of the eligibility
provision when justified by the parties' practices, the practices as
shown could not reasonably justify the conclusion reached by the
42. See discussion of category (2) in note 15 supra.
43. See, e.g., 363 U.S. at 581-82 (1960).
44. See the Supreme Court's remarks concerning the arbitrator's opinion in Enterprise which arguably purported to base the award on the requirements of the positive
law rather than on the agreement. 363 U.S. at 597-98 (1960).
45. 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964).
46. The arbitrator found cases in which the pension board had awarded: (1) pensions in cases where there was less than the expressly required twenty-five years of
continuous employment but over thirty years of total service; (2) pensions where the
recipient was under the expressly required age but had thirty years or more of employment; (3) an increment to pension-eligible employees whose jobs had been terminated by the closing of a division until the recipients reached the age of eligibility
for social security benefits.
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arbitrator as to the second class of employees.47 The basis for the
court's power to vacate this part of the award was stated to be the
requirement that an award derive its essence from the agreement
between the parties.48 Thus, under the aegis of category (3), the
court struck down part of the arbitrator's award because it did not
correspond to the court's view of a proper interpretation of the
parties' practices.49
The common misapprehension of the Porter and Torrington
courts was their apparent assumption that the language on which
category (3) is based50 authorized them to review at least the reasonableness of the conclusion that the arbitrator had drawn from the
parties' practices. 51 This assumption, and the overstepping of the
Supreme Court's limits on the scope of judicial review which it entails, may have stemmed from the belief that the Supreme Court
could not have intended the scope of review under category (3) to
be as limited as the language in the trilogy seems to indicate, as well
as from the fear that such a limited role for the courts provides insufficient control over the arbitrator. Such a fear is not irrational.
The language of category (3), properly read, permits vacation of an
award for failure to draw its essence from the agreement only when
the arbitrator's language clearly shows that the award was based on
something other than the arbitrator's interpretation of the parties'
agreement.52 Since, as the Supreme Court noted in the trilogy,
arbitrators are under no legal obligation to submit opinions, 53 an
arbitrator could always avoid a judicial finding of "manifest infidelity" simply by not submitting an opinion. This fear seems to be
47. 333 F.2d at 602.
48. Ibid.
49. But see Christensen, supra note 15, at 693, where it is suggested that Porter,
unlike either Torrington or American Thread (discussed in note 14 supra), represents
adherence to the proper limitations upon judicial interference with the merits of an
award established by category (3). The author postulates that since there was no sup•
port for the award of pro-rata pensions to workers with less than twenty-five years of
service in either the express terms of the contract or the management pension board's
practices, that that aspect of the award must have been based on the arbitrator's "own
brand of industrial justice" rather than on the terms of the contract.
Compare H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964), with
Local 7-644, Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 986 (1966).
50. Although the Torrington case has been treated herein as a category (2) case,
the language of the opinion in that case does not recognize the distinction between
categories (2) and (3), and, in fact, cites the trilogy language upon which category (3)
is based as authority for its power to refuse enforcement of the award at issue. 362
F.2d at 680 n.5.
51. For example, in Porter the court stated: "(A]bsent any provision either explicitly or implicitly authorizing the arbitrator's ruling in Part 2 of his award, or any
prior practice which reasonably could so interpret it, [sic] he lacked a basis for his
conclusion." 333 F.2d at 602. (Emphasis added.)
52. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
53. 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
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especially prevalent in past practice cases, perhaps because of the
greater potential for abuse in these cases which results from the fact
that the arbitrator does not even purport to rely on the written
agreement.
The legitimacy of the judicial concern, however, does not
minimize the subversive effect of the Porter-Torrington rationale on
the non-intervention policy of the trilogy. There is, of course, room
for the argument that the trilogy has drawn the line against intervention too tightly. Indeed, the trilogy offers little safeguard against
capricious arbitration. In Porter, for example, even if the arbitrator
had clearly subverted the parties' agreement by "liberally interpreting" the pension eligibility clause to authorize pro-rata pension
benefits for every employee whose job was terminated, 64 the trilogy
rule of non-intervention, if applied, would have prevented the court
from refusing to enforce the award. Moreover, current dissatisfaction with the arbitration system and questioning of the premises
upon which the trilogy was based have resulted in increasing pressure on the courts to allow some degree of judicial review on the
merits of arbitration awards. 55 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
clearly indicated its view that the dangers arising from strict limitations on judicial review of awards are outweighed by a number of
considerations: the desirability of having the controversy settled in
the manner, and by the personnel, chosen by the parties; 56 the arbitrator's expertise in interpreting collective bargaining agreements,
and his familiarity with the conditions of the plant or industry involved;57 and the fear, borne out by experience, that courts in the
business of interpreting collective bargaining agreements are likely
to make bad law. 58 These advantages would be threatened by any
standard of review which would give the courts a foothold for substituting their own view on the merits in a contract dispute for that
of the arbitrator. Nor would limiting review to the question of
whether the award could reasonably have been based on the agreement provide a sufficient safeguard against this type of judicial in54. In Porter the arbitrator had :refused at the outset to award severance pay on
the ground that to do so would constitute an unauthorized addition to the agreement,
333 F.2d at 599.
55. See HAYS, LABOR ArulITRATION, A DISSENTING VIEW 80 (1966); Rubenstein, Some
Thoughts on Labor Arbitration, 49 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 695 (1966); Smith & Jones, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with
Comments, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1115 (1964); Straus, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics,
20 Arul. J. 197 (1965).
56. 363 U.S. at 582 (1960).
57. Ibid; 363 U.S. at 596 (1960).
58. See Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev.
471, 475 (1962). See also Mayer, Judicial "Bulls'' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor
Arbitration, 2 LAB. L.J. 502 (1951); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or
Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 1 (1952). Compare Herzog, Judi•
cial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need, 5 DE PAUL L. R.Ev. 14 (1955).

June 1967]

Notes

1659

trusion. Porter and Torrington themselves indicate that an award
which could not "reasonably" have been based upon the agreement
will inevitably be one which differs too greatly from that which the
court would itself have rendered had it been in the arbitrator's shoes.
Assuming that the Supreme Court intends to adhere to the doctrine prohibiting review of labor arbitration awards on the merits,59
the kind of veiled transgression of this principle which occurred in
Torrington and Porter might be discouraged if the Supreme Court
adopted a rule which permitted the lower courts to condition enforcement of an award on an affirmative showing that it was based
on the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement between the
parties-a rule which would in practice necessitate written opinions
by arbitrators. Operating under such a rule, the courts could then
adopt the approach of a recent district court decision 60 in which the
court was presented with an award based in part on the practices
between the parties. While not reviewing the merits of the controversy, the district judge was able to determine that the arbitrator
had carried "out with fidelity his obligation to interpret and apply
the contract" 61 from the fact that his written opinion supported the
award with a discussion of the relevant contractual provisions and
prior practices and his interpretation thereof. 62 By modifying its
guidelines to permit the lower courts to adopt this approach, the
Supreme Court could more clearly direct their focus to the process
by which the arbitrator reached his result rather than to the merits
of the result itself.
59. It is, perhaps, an open question whether the present Court would adhere in all
respects to the holding of the trilogy. Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor
Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 751 (1965), apparently talces the position that recent decisions indicate that the Court has undergone no basic changes in its views. They do not discuss, however, the following dictum
of Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the majority in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964):
It is sufficient for present purposes that the demands are not so plainly unreasonable that the subject matter of the dispute must be regarded as nonarbitrable
because it can be seen in advance that no award to the Union could receive
judicial sanction.
376 U.S. at 555. Although the holding, affirming an order to arbitrate, is certainly
consistent with the trilogy, this particular language is indeed reminiscent of the
Cutler-Hammer approach expressly disapproved by the Court in the trilogy. See
discussion in note 7 supra. See also Rubenstein, Some Thoughts on Labor Arbitration,
49 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 695, 713 n.54 (1960).
60. Local 77, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 252 F. Supp.
787 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
61. Id. at 791.
62. The language in Philadelphia Orchestra may be interpreted as standing for a
somewhat different proposition as well, that in cases in which the arbitrator has relied
on the parties' practices, the courts may inquire whether the decision to go beyond
the express terms and look to the parties' practices was arbitrary or capricious. 252
F. Supp. at 792. Compare Local 77, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Philadelphia Orchestra
Ass'n, 252 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1966), with Marble Prods. Co. v. Local 155, United
Stone Workers, 335 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1964).
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There is no apparent limitation on the authority of the Supreme
Court to require arbitrators to render written opinions. 63 Although
the Court noted in the trilogy that arbitrators presently "have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award," 64 the
advantages of such a requirement were specifically emphasized: "a
well-reasoned opinion [by the arbitrator] tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process." 65 Moreover, the arguments
that such a requirement would be unduly burdensome, and that it
would lead to the rigidity of stare decisis in a field which requires
flexibility, are both unpersuasive. A brief memorandum of decision
setting forth the grievance, the relevant contractual provisions, the
relevant past practices of the parties, and the interpretation of those
provisions or practices deemed to support the result would certainly
suffice. To the extent that the proposed rule would force the arbitrator to articulate his reasoning in each case rather than allow him to
"shoot from the hip," it would appear to be more beneficial than
harmful. Nor does the fact that prior decisions are available for
reference mean that an arbitrator must adhere to precedent which
he is not disposed to follow. Indeed, the availability of opinions
which an arbitrator may wish to follow when he finds their reasoning persuasive might upgrade, rather than rigidify, arbitration decisions. Thus, although the suggested modification of the trilogy
guidelines would probably not be sufficient to stem entirely the
increasing pressure for major revision of those guidelines, it seems
to be a practicable step toward reconciling the desire to minimize
judicial intervention with the fear of capricious arbitration, and
toward eliminating the type of judicial usurpation found in Torrington and Porter.
63. See Wellington, supra note 58, at 479 ("it is not clear why a court could not
insist that an arbitrator produce an unambiguous and reasoned opinion'').
64. 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
65. Ibid.

